Chinese Philosophy in the Perspective of Comparative Philosophy (I)
主讲人：Prof. Yong Huang 黄勇 教授 (Department of Philosophy, The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
主持人: Dr. Jifen Li李记芬 博士（School of Philosophy, RUC）
第三讲：The Self-Centeredness Objection to Virtue Ethics: Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucian Response
12月22日周四 14：00-17：00 地点：人文楼6层会议室(600)
评论人： Dr. Jifen Li李记芬 博士（School of Philosophy, RUC）
Abstract: As virtue ethics has developed into maturity, it has also met with a number of objections. This talk focuses on the self-centeredness objection: since virtue ethics recommends that we be concerned with our own virtues or virtuous characters, it is self-centered. In response, I first argue that, for Zhu Xi’s neo-Confucianism, the character that a virtuous person is concerned with consists largely in precisely those virtues that incline him or her to be concerned with the good of others. While such an answer is also available to the Aristotelian virtue ethics, I argue that Zhu Xi’s neo-Confucianism can better respond to the objection on two deeper levels: (1) a virtuous person is not only concerned with others’ external well-being but also their virtuous characters, and (2) a virtuous person’s concern with others’ well- being, both internal and external, is neither self-indulgent nor self-e acing.
第四讲：Empathy with the Devils: What We Can Learn from Wang Yangming
评论人：Prof. Haiming Wen 温海明（School of Philosophy, RUC）
Abstract: Although it is now generally accepted that the philosophical discussion of empathy appeared in China much earlier than in the West, it is also believed that such discussion in traditional Chinese philosophy has been rendered out of date by the extensive contemporary philosophical and psychological studies of empathy in the West. While I think this claim is true in some aspects, I shall argue that there are a number of important Confucian insights into the phenomenon of empathy that have been largely neglected in these contemporary studies. In this talk, by focusing on the Ming Dynasty neo-Confucian Wang Yangming’s (1472–1529) philosophy, I shall discuss one of them: empathy with the unempathic person, or, simply, empathy with the devil. Since Wang’s view on this issue is only part of his general view of empathy and cannot be properly understood independently, however, I shall first present his more general and less controversial view of empathy as commonly understood.
Yong Huang, Ph.D in Philosophy (Fudan University) and Th.D in Religious Studies (Harvard University), had taught at Kutztown University of Pennsylvania since 1996 before he moved to the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2013. With interest in both philosophy and religious studies and familiar with both Western and Chinese traditions, his research focus has been on moral (both ethical and political) issues from an interdisciplinary and comparative perspective. Dr. Huang received Chambliss Research Award in 2005, recognizing both the number and quality of his scholarly publications. Recently he has published Why Be Moral? Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers, 2014, State University of New York Press; Moral Relativism and Chinese Philosophy: David Wong Responds to Critics (Co-edited, with Yang Xiao, with a co-authored Introduction and individually authored essay), 2014, Albany: State University of New York Press; and Confucius: Guide for the Perplexed, 2013, London: Continuum Publications. In addition to 50 plus journal articles and book chapters published in Chinese, Dr. Huang has also published an equal number of research articles in English in such journals as Harvard Theological Review, Journal of Asian Studies, Journal of Philosophical Research, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, and so on.